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TENDER

TENDER, PAYMENT OF INTO COURT
In the numerous decisions wherein the term "tender" is defined and construed, the many phases of the subject are amply
dealt with, such as form, necessity, effect and manner of pleading, etc. The particular aspect of the subject of tender with
which this article will deal, will be with relation to the payment
of money into court.
Payment implies an acceptance and appropriation of that which
is offered by one party to another, whereas tender is the act of
offering that which is admitted to be due and owing, but which is
not accepted by the creditor.' The tender does not discharge the
debt whereas payment does. The payment of money into court
is more than a simple tender. It is purely ex parte; if not accepted, the debtor must keep his money, and if established on plea
the only effect is to stop interest on the amount tendered. The
rule of keeping tender good applies to justices' courts, courts of
admiralty, and to all courts of inferior civil jurisdiction. The
practice extends to the recovery of an unliquidated sum in cases
where the statute permits a tender to be made. Where the offer
and refusal are made the basis of an action, where but for such
offer and refusal no right of action would have existed, the tender
must be brought into court.2 This is not the case, however, where
the right of relief is not dependant upon tender and refusal.
It is also the rule at common law that in order to render a
plea of tender available, the money must have been paid into court.
Sureties, however, are discharged by a valid tender although not
paid into court. 32 Cyc. 172.
NECESSITY AND EFFECT

Bringing the money. into court being a requirement for
plaintiff's benefit, he is entitled to have it brought in before he
takes issue on the plea. A plea of profert in curia with
the profert not being made good by the actual deposit of the
money in court is bad, and plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the
3
plea.
'Barker v. Brink, 5 Iowa 481; Hunter v. Warner, i Wis. 141; Babcock
v. Perry, 8 Wis. 277.
'Musgat v. Pumpelly, 46 Wis. 66o, i N. W. 196; Newton v. AiY, 16

Wis. 197.
'Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 45 N. W. 21; Breitenback v.
Turner, 18 Wis. 14o; Werner v. Tuck, 24 Am. St. Rep. 443, and notes.
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Payment being a requirement for plaintiff's benefit it is waived
by neglecting to bring any irregularity to the attention of the
court and taking issue on the plea of tender. On this point see the
case of Wetherbee v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 359, 2 N. W. 45, holding
that while ordinarily upon tender the money should be brought
into court, still a party may waive the necessity for doing so. And
since the notice setting up tender stated that the money was
deposited in a certain bank subject to plaintiff's order, plaintiff
should have made his objection to the sufficiency of the tender in
the court below. Under the California Code of deposit in a bank
to the credit of a creditor after a tender extinguishes an obligation
for the payment of money. This is not the case in most jurisdictions however, the obligation to pay remaining good and in force
until the cause has been decided by the court.
Under the common law the lien of a mortgage was not discharged by a tender whether the money was paid into court or
not. In order to discharge the lien it was necessary to bring suit
for redemption and pay the money into court. The rule which
prevails under the codes differs in different states, and the
question upon which this difference of opinion develops, is
principally as to the necessity of paying the money into court to
discharge a lien, in the case of tender after maturity. 4 In some
states a proper tender is all that is ncessary; in others the tender
must be kept good by a payment of the money into court. A
futher distinction is sometimes made in the case of chattel
mortgages. 5 In this respect Wisconsin holds that a proper tender
discharges the lien.6 Where the tender is to be made the basis of
7
an action for affirmative relief the same rule applies.
In many states the effect of a tender and consequent keeping
good or failure to keep good is dealt with by statute and in that
event of course the rule there laid down applies: but in most of
these states the statute is not a radical departure from the general
principles announced by the courts in long lines of decisions on
the subject, but is more in the nature of a legislative sanction of
'Kortwright v. Cody,

21 N. Y. 343, 78 Am. Dec. 145, need not be kept
good to discharge lien. (See Breitenbach v. Turner, ante.) Contra,
Crasin v. McGoon, 86 Ill. 4-1, 29 Am. Rep. 37.
'Notes in 33 L. R. A. 238. See notes to Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich.
77 Am. Dec. 468.
'Rice v. Kahn, 70 Wis. 323, 35 N. W. 465; Smith v. Phillips, 47 Wis.
202, 2 N. W. 285; Ahtsgat v. Puinpelly, ante.
'Smith v. Phillips, ante.
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those principles.

See Circuit Court Rule 15; Sect. 4267, Wis.

Stats. Cf. sect. 2789.
As AN ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION

It is the general rule upheld by authorities with but few exceptions that a tender and payment into court admits liability to
the amount tendered.8
But there is considerable conflict of
authority as to the effect of a tender on the right of a defendant
to avail himself of defenses to prevent further recovery, or by
means of a counterclaim to defeat a recovery even to the extent of
the tender. The question is whether the effect of tender is to
limit the issue to the amount of damages recoverable, the tender
being admittedly due; or whether a tender admits only that amount
as due, and leaves available all defenses and counterclaims. This
question is further complicated by the fact that a distinction is
sometimes made in actions on contract and actions on tort;
frequently these distinctions are overlooked by the courts. The
rule laid down in Palmer v. La Rault 99 Pac. 1036, that the effect
of a tender of the amount claimed under a contract does not
preclude defendant from asserting a counterclaim for damages
under the contract, is fairly illustrative of this line of authority.
The other line of cases may be said to be represented by the cabe
of La Salle County v. Hathway, 78 Ill. App. 95, holding that upon
tender by defendant the trial court may properly give a peremptory
instruction to find the issues for plaintiff. The question of
damages alone remaining for the consideration of the jury.9 But
it is stated in Fox v. Williams, 92 Wis. 320, that judgment cannot
be rendered for a less amount than is tendered or paid in.
Where tender is made by defendant of the difference between plaintiff's demand and defendant's set-off it admits
plaintiff's entire debt is due.' 0 But payment into court nr-er
admits liability for more than the amount tendered, and defendant
may interpose any consistent defense to show that he is not liable
for a greater sum. Tender is usually understood to be on the
implied condition that it is made as a complete satisfaction for the
debt defendant owes. So where defendant elects to take on the
plea of tender before suit commenced, money that is paid into

'Schnur
v. Hickcox, 45 Wis.
9

2oo.

Palatine Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 68 At. 484, i6 L. P,. A.. (N. S.)
See notes in 77 Am. Dec. pa. 483.
' 0Barker v. Gray, 112 Wis. 487, 88 N. W. 307.

1055.
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court is received in full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim against
defendant. Plaintiff can have no further claim against him.11
THE TIME AND MANNER OF PAYMENT

As to the amount and kind to be paid in to make a tender
effectual the general rule may be briefly summed up. If tender
is made before suit commenced the same amount must be paid
in as tendered. If tender is made after suit commenced it must
include interest and costs accrued up to that time. 12 If the tender
be of money or stocks, bonds or such articles as a person usually
carries about his person, it must be brought into court.'8 If it be
the tender of a ponderous specific article it need not be brought
into court.
A tender is not objectionable because made for a larger amount
than is due. But a creditor cannot be required to accept part of
a debt which has not become due. In Smith v. Curtiss, 38 Mich.
393, defendant deducted from a claim against him a set-off due to
him and the tender was kept good and a judgment deducting all
costs was rendered.
Where money is tendered a certificate of deposit payable to
the clerk of the court or creditor is good. The plaintiff may
object to the tender on the ground that it is not legal money as
stipulated for although made in good bank notes, and even though
that be not the real reason for the objection. 38 Cyc. 146. A
payment into court of a check is not good,14 but a tender of a
check may be kept good by a payment into court of the money.
The payment into court should generally be made at the time
when tender is pleaded.' In some states the matter is regulated
by statute prescribing the time for payment into court, in which
case a substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient. In
other jurisdictions notice of payment into court must be given to
plaintiff's attorney; but proceeding without objection waives
notice. In equity the weight of authority is to the effect that it is
unnecessary to pay the money into court at the time of the commencement of the suit; it is sufficient to offer by the bill to bring

' Turner v. Lee Mach. Co., 41 S. W. 57; see notes in 38 L. R. A. 549.
"Warrington v Pollard, 24 Iowa, 281, 95 Am. Dec. 727; 38 Cyc. 149.
Chalutz v. Wis. Central R. Co., 143 Wis. 623.
"Mitchell v. MeniU, 2 Blackford, 87 (Ind.), 18 Am. Dec. 128.
" Lewis v. Larsen, 45 Wis. 353, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332. But see
Kiefert v. Maple Valley Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 34o, 148 N. W. 864.
"He3wood Boat Co. v. Ralph, 82 Hun. 418, 31 N. Y. Supp. 263.
236
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the amount in whenever the same is liquidated and a decree is
had for performance.1 5a With what has been said on this point
it may be sufficient to repeat, that tender to be effective must as
a general rule be supported by paying into court at the time of
pleading. Rice v. Kahn, 70 Wis. 323.
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When tender is pleaded and money is to be paid into court, the
clerk of the court is the proper person to receive the money and
his custody is the custody of the court. The payment to the clerk
is for the plaintiff. He is custodian for the plaintiff, and any loss
of money paid to the clerk for the plaintiff is the loss of the
plaintiff. Mann v. Sprout, 185 N. Y. io 9 . A payment to the
referee upon a trial before him, is not payment to the court; he
is not the court for that purpose. Becher v. Boon, 6i N. Y. 217.
WITHDRAWAL OF MONEY PAMD IN
After money has once been paid into court as tender there is a
substantial uniformity in the rule holding that the title to it is
absolutely vested in the plaintiff or tenderee.'O It may be withdrawn by him at any time. In such case if he withdraws the
money he waives all objections to the money. But if tender is
made as a condition to the enforcement of a right, title does not
pass to the opposite party and the court may permit a withdrawal
by defendant. In the case of Fox v. Williams, 92 Wis. 320, the
fact that payment into court was not essential to plaintiff's right
of action, but nevertheless plaintiff was not allowed to withdraw
the money does not make the case an exception to the rule.
The tender into court being an admission in plaintiff's favor
to that amount, judgment cannot be rendered for a less amount.Y
Where, however, defendant has a greater sum due him such payment will not affect his right to recover for that amount in the
same action. In an action on a contract defendant claimed that a
smaller sum was due plaintiff and secured an order to pay the
money into court and plaintiff to have leave to withdraw the
money at any time. Defendant later moved to amend his answer,
withdraw the money paid in, and set up a counterclaim. The

1 Bateinan v. Hopkins, 73 S. F. 133, 28 Ann. Cas. 642.
v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 113 Wis. " 88 N. W. gig. Newton

'Stolze

v. Allis, 16 Wis. 197.

'Schnur

v. Hickcox, ante.
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motion was granted and plaintiff appealed. The supreme court
held that the power to authorize an amendment so as to change
the issues did not authorize the court to permit a defendant upon
amending his answer, to withdraw money which has been paid into
court in satisfaction of a debt due to plaintiff.,
Where on a finding of the jury the amount due defendant on
his counterclaim was greater than the amount of plaintiff's
demand, plaintiff's right of action was extinguished and defendant
was allowed to withdraw the money paid in as a tender.'"
If a statute authorizes a payment into court under eminent
domain proceedings, of the amount awarded by the commissioners,
and the railway corporation or whatever the use for which the
land is condemned be, is entitled to go into posession thereupon
the corporation can not reclaim any such money. Though if the
corporation appeals, the statute further provides that the land
owner cannot withdraw the money without first giving a bond to
protect the corporation from loss in the event of a final reduction
20
of the award.
A deposit with a bank or third person does not prevent a
withdrawal if there has been no acceptance. In other instances
it has been held that money paid into court might be withdrawn
before the court has treated the money as a fund under its control,
and before plaintiff has accepted it.2' But the case often cited
on this point is Mann v. Sprout, 185 N. Y. io9, which holds that
the effect of such a payment into court is to transfer the title to
the creditor, although he does not signify his acceptance, and it
cannot be withdrawn by the debtor even with the consent of the
court.
The law as it exists in Wisconsin on this subject exhibits a
marked conformity to the better reasoned decisions of the
majority. In the case of equitable actions it is not necessary in
Wisconsin to support the plea of tender by payment into court.
It is sufficient that the tenderer offer to bring the money in, and
22
be ready to do so as the court may direct.
As to the admission of plaintiff's cause of action by tender into
"uMannv. Sprout, 185 N. Y. iog.

"Ahrens v. Fenton, 138 Iowa 559 ii5.N. W. 233.

= Stoke v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., ante, Notes in 16 L. R. A. Io55.
Wright v. Yoing, 6 Wis. 127; Note in 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561.
'Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wig. 14o.
238
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court by defendant, some courts hold that everything which
plaintiff is required to prove is admitted, only the costs and
amount of damages remaining to be determined. Wisconsin holds
that as to the amount so paid in it is a conclusive admission that
as to that sum it belongs to the plaintiff absolutely whether the
proof shows plaintiff to be entitled to more or less. 23 As to
whether or not defendant may assert a counterclaim and thus
defeat plaintiff's right to the money paid into court there seems
to be no case in point in Wisconsin. However, it is probable that
defendant cannot by counterclaim defeat plaintiff's rights to the
money paid in to support a tender.
The manner of paying money into court in Wisconsin is
governed by Circuit Court Rule No. 15.
JEROME C. WHALEN, '24.
'Fox v. Williams, 92 Wis. 32o, 66 N. W. 357.
"See Tollefson v. Tollefson, 171 Wis. 149, 176 N. W. 879; Frank v.
Frost, 170 Wis. 353, 174 N. W. gn.
Weigell v. Gregg, 16i Wis. 413, 154 N. W. 645.
Mankell v. Belscainper,84 Wis. 218, 225, 54 N. W. 5oo.

See also Secs. 4265, 4266, 4267, Wis. Stats.

